… & Why We Cannot Trust the CNSC

Introduction: BWXT is a U.S.-based company that processes uranium for nuclear reactors at Lansdowne & Dupont (1025 Lansdowne) in Toronto. BWXT, involved in the U.S. weapons industry, bought the GE-Hitachi location in 2016. The company is currently involved in a class action lawsuit down in the U.S. (See articles here & here). Many Torontonians now feel that, due to its emissions, health impacts, impacts on water sources (from unmonitored discharges to the Toronto sewer system), and the potential for a very serious accident at the site (now a very fast-growing residential community), this facility must be shut down. Canada’s nuclear “regulator” (more on CNSC below) is recommending the facility receive a 10-year extension to its licence, & is holding a public hearing in Toronto (& Peterborough, another of its Canadian locations) March 2-5 (see agenda here). There is plenty of information about all this on this Web site & this Facebook page. Another good information source is this one (& see a great video here). To read submissions from members of the public regarding BWXT’s licence request, go to this page (& click on “Download a particular document,” which brings up the list of all submissions).

Why is it you won’t hear these following 12 things from your political representatives, public health “authorities”[1] & the media? Well, it is possible they don’t know them. They may not be deliberately lying to us. More likely that they are simply ignorant of the real story. Why should this be so? It may be convenient for them to not know the real facts about Canada’s nuclear “regulator,” the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). To keep just skating along the surface of the issues involved.

“It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.” – Upton Sinclair

These so-called health & political “leaders” (& members of the media) have almost certainly not taken a really deep dive into the facts about the company, the company’s record, the company’s licensing submission to the CNSC, the CNSC staff submission, CNSC’s reliability as Canada’s nuclear “regulator,” the facility’s previous licensing hearing history, &/or past emergencies and incidents at the facility, etc.

Why do experienced activists and concerned citizens know these things?

Some of us have spent many years involved in nuclear activism. Have taken part in more CNSC hearings (on a wide variety of facilities all over Ontario) than we even care to recall. We are not part of the “nuclear establishment” … nor of any of the various municipal/provincial/regional bureaucracies that accept its pronouncements without question. Some of us have quite a bit of experience on the issue of nuclear emergency planning (for reactor facilities) in Ontario … a deeper topic than one might suppose, though it can be summed up fairly succinctly.[2]

Let’s get started!

1. The CNSC as a nuclear “regulator” has zero credibility among those who have dealt with it over time. Read the information below on ‘Why We Cannot Trust the CNSC’ for why this is so. After reading it, you’ll see why it is an organization in which we may place absolutely no trust whatsoever.

2. A depleted uranium facility in the middle of a residential neighbourhood in Toronto. Really??

“The Toronto facility manufactures natural and depleted uranium dioxide fuel pellets.” [3]

This submission (pg. 10) poses a number of questions about this topic that need to be asked … and answered.

3. There is a hydrogen tank on the BWXT site, situated extremely close to the rail line that is immediately south of the facility. The tank could explode & cause a disaster … in a neighbourhood that is currently growing like the proverbial weed (& also home to several nearby schools). Does this location, for this facility, really make sense – now – in light of current population density & growth?

4. The 1959 deal made between the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)[4] and WHO (World Health Organization) ensures that we now have 60+ years of lack of research by global health bodies into the health impacts of radioactivity.

“Whenever either organization proposes to initiate a program or activity on a subject in which the other organization has or may have a substantial interest, the first party shall consult the other with a view to adjusting the matter by mutual agreement.” From the deal.

Yes! The world’s global nuclear agency & the world’s leading “health” agency, utterly in cahoots! Ever since 1959. Foxes guarding the henhouse, absolutely! This 60-year old deal makes clear why public health agencies don’t study or have anything substantive (or credible) to say about the impacts of radioactivity from nuclear facilities (of any kind) on human health. [5]

5. The industry (BWXT) and CNSC (the “regulator”) talk about release limits that BWXT never comes close to exceeding. This is precisely because the release limits – Derived Release Limits or DRLs – are set so absurdly high, exceeding them could simply never happen! CNSC usually claims to have set the release limits; in practice, they are set by industry. BWXT admits it has set the DRLs itself in its submission. “BWXT NEC has established “Derived Release Limits” for uranium emissions to the environment.” [6] Foxes minding the henhouse again. The DRL issue is well-explained in this submission on page. 12. Also covered in this one. [7]

6. Averaging of releases / emissions data masks dramatic spikes of emissions/releases. The nuclear industry does this routinely, wherever it operates. Industry is not being transparent with the public … nor with media, politicians, or health “authorities.” It is very easy to hide large releases (even major health impacts, even deaths!) when you use averaging of data.

7. According to the Swim Drink Fish Canada/Lake Ontario Waterkeeper submission, BWXT is not adhering to “relevant regulatory guidelines” set out by the Canadian Council of Environmental Ministers (CCME) … or provincial Ontario guidelines for uranium discharges to water.[8] It appears that both federal & provincial “authorities” have a “hands off” policy regarding the facility’s releases of radionuclides to the Toronto sewer system. Foxes & henhouse again. Neither the Province nor the municipality (i.e., the City of Toronto) either monitors or enforces the company’s releases of radionuclides to Toronto’s sewer system. CNSC, as “regulator,” is in charge. Since CNSC cannot be trusted, this is clearly unacceptable.

8. There is a distinct lack of scientific language in both CNSC & BWXT documents. Rather than providing precise data, one continually sees such phrases as “low,” “very low” and “extremely low.” This is not the language of science.

“The consolidated ERA concluded that emissions of radioactive material BWXT NEC consolidated operations would be very low”[9]

CNSC language is also often surprisingly understated. Orwellian, even. Immediately after describing significant serious incidents at the facility, for example (CNSC cites numerous non-compliance examples; in BWXT’s language, “unplanned events;” more on this below in #9), CNSC staff go on to say “CNSC staff conclude that BWXT’s performance over the licence period in the Emergency Preparedness and Fire Protection SCA is satisfactory and the program implementation meets regulatory requirements and CNSC expectations.” [10] CNSC’s use of the word “acceptable” to describe the licensee’s adherence to standards is often jarring. It seems as though a stronger word than “adequate” or “acceptable” would be more … reassuring. (It must be added that there is a distinct “Uh-oh! Down the rabbit hole!” sensation when one encounters CNSC speaking of a recommendation to BWXT – following years of follow-up on serious safety violations – all of this dragging out over years – then adding “Recommendations are not required to be implemented.”[11]

9. There are major inconsistencies between BWXT’s “CMD” (Commission Member Document) & the CNSC Staff CMD in the reporting of significant incidents at BWXT throughout the current licensing period.[12] (See this submission regarding BWXT’s reporting of its activities during this licensing period. Page 16.) BWXT reported 6 incidents, while CNSC reported 22. These incidents led to numerous CNSC inspections and exercises, changes in emergency/fire planning, a CNSC Compliance Inspection Report, etc. None of this is ever explained.

10. The word “emergency” comes up 39 times in the BWXT submission (a 61-page document). 72 times in the CNSC Staff CMD (244 pages).[13] There are 107 mentions in the CNSC Compliance Inspection Report (dated Jan. 25/19) – a document of 31 pages. Note: This report is not on the CNSC Web site. One must request it from the CNSC. One must know to request it. Which most people, unfamiliar with inspections & emergency exercises, would not know to do.[14]

Read this extract from the CNSC Staff CMD:

“In March 2017, CNSC staff issued eight enforcement actions of non-compliance to BWXT related to the effectiveness and implementation of the Toronto facility emergency response program. The enforcement actions were based on CNSC staff observations from a major exercise conducted at the Toronto facility in conjunction with Toronto Fire Services (TFS). Corrective actions identified during this compliance inspection included a need for a formalized mutual aid agreement with TFS; improved incident command functioning and integration with TFS; and a review of BWXT emergency response organization staffing, facilities and equipment to ensure that they are adequate to support an emergency response at the Toronto location.”[15]

11. All this talk of emergencies, inspections, exercises, etc. leads inevitably to questions regarding the safety of the facility. We are talking about missing information in licensing hearing documents. Inconsistencies in the reporting of incidents between the company & the nuclear “regulator.” Changes in emergency plans that are never explained or elaborated upon. And, for that matter, information about emergency plans that is difficult or impossible to obtain.[16] As well, all these ‘incidents” in this licensing period certainly throw the company’s credibility – in terms of claims about safety at previous licensing hearings – into considerable doubt.

12. In the CNSC Compliance Inspection Report (dated January 25, 2019), the sentence “The only acceptable exception to the requirement would be when immediate action was required to prevent a catastrophic incident from occurring” is found in the ‘Compliance Matrix,’ on page 22. So it seems there is in fact the potential for a “catastrophic incident” to take place at the BWXT facility at 1025 Lansdowne.[17] This certainly casts into serious doubt any “authority” who claims there are “no risks” associated with this facility.

“From the CNSC staff perspective, there are no risks,” said Caroline Ducros, director of the safety commission’s nuclear processing facilities division. “The quantities (of uranium) that are leaving the (Toronto) plant are negligible.” Toronto Star article February 16/20.[18]

Why We Cannot Trust the CNSC

CNSC never turns down a licence request – hearings are really just for show. Read it, right from the horse’s mouth.
CNSC has long been perceived as a “lapdog, not a watchdog” (original Greenpeace item no longer available).
“The CNSC is widely perceived to be a “captured regulator” that promotes projects it is tasked with regulating. This was noted by the Expert Panel on Reform of Environmental Assessment in its April 2017 report “Building Common Ground”[1]
The “regulatory capture” of nuclear regulators (& collusion among “regulators” and governments/bureaucracies) is a global phenomenon: Nuclear “Regulatory Capture” — A Global Pattern [2]
“There has not existed the slightest shred of meaningful evidence that the entire intervention process in nuclear energy is anything more than the most callous of charades and frauds.” – Dr. John Gofman, M.D., Ph.D. in “Irrevy” – An Irreverent, Illustrated View of Nuclear Power[3]
CNSC seriously lacks credibility when speaking about matters of nuclear safety. One outstanding example: Asked about the safety of CANDU reactors & the likelihood of an accident at the Pickering Hold Point Hearing (2014), a CNSC senior staffer replies:

“… we can say the risk is zero, because there was never a significant accident in the CANDU fleet.”[4] Risk = zero because no disaster has happened yet? This is the science of probability??
SSI tritium facility in Peterborough: Took CNSC 20 years to discover soil contamination. 18 years to uncover undetected inaccurate data reports from SSI. Sudden shutdown in 2013 before licensing hearing (CNSC staff had recommended in favour of the licence). Item here has some good info about SSI.
In 2018, for the Pickering relicensing hearing, Durham Nuclear Awareness (DNA) attached a disclaimer to our intervention indicating our lack of faith in the CNSC’s independence and process. See the disclaimer here.

2016: CNSC takes multiple serious hits to its credibility

In March 2016 a coalition of 10+ NGOs writes to the Prime Minister to call for “a review of the Nuclear Safety & Control Act, alleging that “Modernization of the NSCA is urgently needed in light of the lack of institutional independence on the part of Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) and lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster.”[5]
CNSC whistleblowers reveal serious deficiencies in CNSC tribunal decision-making. From the posting ‘Nukes. ‘Perfect Storm’ A-Brewing?’

“CNSC “specialists” submitted an anonymous letter, [undated, in May or June 2016] to the President of the CNSC (Michael Binder – appointed in 2008 – after its previous head, Linda Keen, was fired) alleging “Our primary concern is that CNSC commissioners do not receive sufficient information to make balanced judgments.” And, “because insufficient information is made available, other branches of government cannot make informed decisions. For example, the government of Ontario cannot make a good decision about financing the refurbishment of Darlington without knowing all the facts.” Going on to cite several specific cases where tribunal members rendered decisions based on incomplete information; for example, allowing Ontario Power Generation (OPG) & CNSC staff to use out-of-date seismic risk data in a Darlington hearing. The letter is here.

There is also a short description here of a textbook case of CNSC tribunal members not being given full information regarding a situation at the Chalk River facility. (It’s embedded in the October 2016 posting Nukes. ‘Perfect Storm’ A-Brewing?)
Fall 2016 – Canada’s Federal Auditor General publishes a scathing report on CNSC & its inspection of nuclear plants[6]

Globe & Mail: Nuclear-safety agency not adequately inspecting power plants, watchdog says. “The federal agency charged with ensuring the safety of Canada’s nuclear power plants is unable to prove that it is inspecting those facilities often or thoroughly enough or that it has the number of staff required to do the job, says a new report by the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development.”

“The audit found that 75 per cent of inspections carried out by the CNSC were done by an inspector who was not following an approved guide.

“It’s a bit like an airline pilot who doesn’t go through his check list before taking off,” said the commissioner. “That means that the commission can’t tell us, and show us, that they are covering in their site inspections all of their requirements.”[7]

Always &/or In This Case Specifically:

CNSC always seems to be an active advocate for the nuclear proponent (in this case, BWXT), not a real watchdog.
CNSC receives about two-thirds of its funding from industry. The phrase “You don’t bite the hand that feeds you” springs to mind.
Overall lack of scientific rigour & language that underwhelms is always a feature of CNSC hearing documents (e.g. phrases such as: low, very low, acceptable, adequate, satisfactory, etc.)
Derived Release Limits (DRLs): already covered above in 12 Things.
Minor but telling: photo used in Staff CMD is obviously an old, not recent, photo [8]
Inconsistencies between BWXT & CNSC: BWXT under-reports incidents: also covered above in 12 Things.
CNSC Compliance Inspection Report – key report, but not online with other reports; must be requested from <cnsc.interventions.ccsn@canada.ca>
CNSC Compliance Inspection Report – CNSC makes recommendations, then states there is no requirement for BWXT to adopt them!
Describes significant issues with a variety of enforcement actions, then goes on to say blandly (and very unconvincingly) “All is well.”[9]
Most ratings of BWXT in Staff CMD (Commission Member Document) are assessed at Satisfactory – not Fully Satisfactory. Very unreassuring!

P.S. How the Events of 2016 Are Utterly Relevant to This Hearing (scroll down below the footnotes for this added section)

[1] https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/environment/conservation/environmental-reviews/building-common-ground/building-common-ground.pdf (page 49)

[2] “The conclusion of a report of a Japanese parliamentary panel issued last week that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster was rooted in government-industry “collusion” and thus was “man-made” is mirrored throughout the world. The “regulatory capture” cited by the panel is the pattern among nuclear agencies right up to the International Atomic Energy Agency.” Source.

[3] Dr. Gofman helped isolate the first milligram of plutonium for the Manhattan Project. When he later came to realize the damaging effects of radiation on health, he became a fierce, vocal foe of nuclear energy. Great article on him here.

[4] The Pickering Hold Point transcript, page 132

[5] Letter here.

[6] Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2016 Fall Reports of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development Report 1—Inspection of Nuclear Power Plants—Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, here.

[7] Globe and Mail; CBC: Nuclear power plant safety inspections hit and miss, watchdog says

[8] CNSC Staff CMD, pg. 12

[9] CNSC Staff CMD, pages 63-64.

P.S. How the Events of 2016 Are Utterly Relevant to This Hearing

** If I even need to say all this, which quite possibly I don’t… Just offering to connect the dots here.

To learn that the CNSC tribunal (or commission) members are not given all the relevant facts, yet are charged with making the big decisions on all of the country’s nuclear facilities, well … need we really say any more??

And,

In reading the BWXT submission, & learning that a number of events – incidents – “unplanned events” – occurred, which led to additional CNSC inspections and “exercises” with Toronto Fire Services & Toronto Paramedic Services [See BWXT Submission, pg. 42],

Yet all the while knowing that CNSC does not exactly have the greatest reputation for its inspections, hmmmm? See above, & this quote also…

“Her report said the CNSC could not demonstrate that its inspection plans included the appropriate number and types of inspections, or that it had the staff needed to verify that nuclear power plants were complying with requirements.

She said there were errors and incomplete information in the database, recording inspections had been done when they had not been done, and in other cases showing inspections as incomplete when they had in fact been completed.

Nuclear power plant safety inspections hit and miss, watchdog says” CBC News Item here.

& knowing that there are inconsistencies in reporting of “unplanned” events between BWXT & CNSC, as described here:

“A number of reportable (unplanned) events have occurred at BWXT during its current licence period.11 BWXT’s licence application document cites 6 events, while the CNSC document cites 22 events. This discrepancy makes it awkward for a member of the public to track such events and even try to figure out why there is this glaring difference. For example: the CNSC provides the following table for the number of events that have occurred during the years 2011-2019.” [See submission here, on pg. 15 of the pdf; pg. 9 of the original submission]

And that a great deal is not explained by BWXT in its submissions (details of the “unplanned events” are not only not full or accurate, what is supplied is scant, to say the very least)

And also knowing (as laid out in this submission), that the “unplanned events” that occurred in 2016, as laid out by the CNSC Staff:

dragged on & on (& on), such that it becomes clear (again, in this submission) that whatever it was that happened in 2016 (which btw is never explained) led to “ enforcement actions” in 2017 & ultimately (see again in CNSC CMD above) an exercise in September 2018…

which led to a final report in early 2019 (said report not being online with relevant reports for this hearing; one has to be quite curious as to why this should be so)

& then one finds (in said unavailable report), the suggestion that a “catastrophic incident” is possible

And that CNSC makes a (very broad) recommendation to the licensee

BWXT-2018-04-R1: BWXT should review recommendations from its full report and implement self-identified improvements to its emergency preparedness program. [This from the CNSC Compliance Inspection Report dated January 25, 2018 which not online with other relevant reports for this hearing]

& then goes on to say

“Recommendations are not required to be implemented.” [Appendix A of CNSC Compliance Inspection Report, Pg. 12]

Well. I rest my case. We’re dizzy, we’re confused, we’re bamboozled – incredulous, even!

We feel sure we’ve gone down a rabbit hole! And not a pretty one, either.

Does all this inspire your trust in either BWXT, or in Canada’s nuclear “regulator?”

Durham Nuclear Awareness

BWXT: 12 Things Toronto’s Medical Officer of Health, Your Local Politicians & the Media Are Not Telling You

… & Why We Cannot Trust the CNSC

See also the item that follows on *Why We Cannot Trust the CNSC***

Why We Cannot Trust the CNSC

2016: CNSC takes multiple serious hits to its credibility

Always &/or In This Case Specifically:

P.S. How the Events of 2016 Are Utterly Relevant to This Hearing (scroll down below the footnotes for this added section)

P.S. How the Events of 2016 Are Utterly Relevant to This Hearing

Does all this inspire your trust in either BWXT, or in Canada’s nuclear “regulator?”

One thought on “BWXT: 12 Things Toronto’s Medical Officer of Health, Your Local Politicians & the Media Are Not Telling You”

… & Why We Cannot Trust the CNSC

** See also the item that follows on Why We Cannot Trust the CNSC

Why We Cannot Trust the CNSC

2016: CNSC takes multiple serious hits to its credibility

Always &/or In This Case Specifically:

P.S. How the Events of 2016 Are Utterly Relevant to This Hearing (scroll down below the footnotes for this added section)

P.S. How the Events of 2016 Are Utterly Relevant to This Hearing

Does all this inspire your trust in either BWXT, or in Canada’s nuclear “regulator?”

One thought on “BWXT: 12 Things Toronto’s Medical Officer of Health, Your Local Politicians & the Media Are Not Telling You”

See also the item that follows on *Why We Cannot Trust the CNSC***